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Niarchos' ship captains named Katopodes brought a libel action I believe it was, against Onassis for some letter he had written about some activities of Katapodes, I can't remember the details now.

We didn't know where this was leading. So this was in the Supreme Court of New York State, and so I went to a fellow I knew in the U.S. Attorney's office and asked him if he could keep track of how this suite was developing to see if it was leading into some of the connections we had, particularly with Niarchos.

And he got some of the pleadings and some of the pretrial evidence --

Mr. Wides. But you don't recall any contacts between the Agency and the Justice Department resulting in Mr. Yeagley going up to try and halt some aspects of the grand jury proceedings in New York growing out --

Mr. Houston. It strikes no valve.

Let me ask just one more question in this area and then we will move on to the document I asked you to look at before we started.

Mr. Maxwell. I have just one other question.

Mr. Wides

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Do you recall that incident and the eventual denouement of the affair?

Mr. Houston I cannot remember the exact chronology.

I had thought they had gotten the report on the problem a

little earlier than you suggested. But I can't argue it.

It was a confused picture. All sorts of interpersonal feelings

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They said to the effect, thank you, that is it. There is nothing we can do.

Mr. Wides. Was there any discussion of the possibility

that I recall were going on out there. And Ithink one of the

And I said, there is no particular problem, because there is nothing we can do about it because there is no crime against the U.S. that I can find in this situation, it is a crime against

And Allen said, that well may be. But I still think that I want to report this to Justice.

So, I did prepare a report and delivered it to -- I can't remember -- probably to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, who ever it was.

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Did you have another question in this area?

Mr. Maxwell. I just wanted to say, if you wanted to continue, you said there were three cases that eliminated the

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kind of cases which CIA had with Justice, and the referrals, and you had gone through one. And I wondered if you wanted to go through the other two.

Mr. Houston. All right.

The second one was quite an interesting one. it in too much detail, excuse me.

Mr. Maxwell. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Maxwell. Back on therecord.

Mr. Houston. all of a sudden disappeared from his post, and there was indication that he had with him a considerable sum of money, something in the nature of \$30,000, I can't remember the exact amount. This was promptly reported, and he disappeared into the blue.

started looking into it. And I believe we sent people over to try and look into it, and found that there had been a serious family problem between himself and his wife.

Finally, in Mexico we got word that this fellow was near Mexico City, and he passed word hrough a lawyer that he had written all the to the operational details of what he had been engaged in which again were very sensitive, sealed them, and put them in a vault which only thelawyers could get at, with instruc-

tions to his lawyers that if anything happened to him, no

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The SEC, as a result has raised some questions with Justice between our justice and our statutory problems. before Justice now.

Mr. Wides. Is there a file in the OGC office generally regarding, not necessarily every one, but many of your -which would contain many or most of OGC contacts with Administrative agencies over the years?

Mr. Houston. No, because they weren't -- there probably is a substantial file on relations with Internal Revenue. But those were to a large part either working out our own tax equations on our own personnel with cover problems which you probably know about, or the CAT situation, or Southern Air Transport, and not interferring with IRS prosecutions, although several times we were involved -- here is the type of case I guess you are talking about.

What is the fellow out in the Philippines -- I think his name is - who had one of the biggest tax assessments made against an individual made against him, I think, \$2 million? And very definitely tried to involve us in his defense. There was some connection with in the Philippines, you couldn't be in the Philippines without some connection with them. And yet gave IRS the full information, and said, don't bother with us, we are not concerned.

Mr. Wides. What about such things as the contacts with

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Mr. Houston. It was a memo of DITEL's that I saw.

I think it was dated after I left. I saw it in draft afterward. It had to do, I recall, with operations in the Trust Territories.

Mr. Wides. In other words, the first category of issue that I mentioned?

Mr. Houston. Yes.

Mr. Wides. With regard to MH MUTUAL, which is a topic that we obviously don't have time to discuss fully today, and we have not yet seen the files, I wonder -- and Mr. Maxwell was going to pursue this, and I may be back -- if you could give me a rough idea during the period when it was under your stewardship of the organizational chart, as it were, for the

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Mr. Houston. There were about two or maybe three recommendations from the Investment Counsel we had at the time we were turned down --

Mr. Wides. Excuse me. Was the Investment Counsel the person you were referring to?

Mr. Houston. No, this was an outside investment counsel we retained for advice for a period of time.

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So, finally, we decided that while we had gone to him for a good reason, that is, so we could show that we had relied on outside counsel of known stature, that it was not fair either to him or to us to be in circumstances where we were readly secondguessing him through our own internal procedures and our own invetment sort of Board of Directors. So we left, I hope, on friendly terms.

Mr. Wides. About when was that?

Mr. Houston. Let me guess at around 1969, something

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like that.

Mr. Wides. Up until then as far as you know there was no investment of Agency funds that were made as a result of any decisions or implications within the CIA which might then have been run by him for his independent advice but might have originated or prompted within the Agency?

Mr. Houston. There may have been those. You see, on our Board of Directors to which we referred all basic investment decisions we had three of our top economists, and at least one of them was a member of a couple of college investment boards, so that they had the benefit of the advice to those university investment counsel.

Mr. Wides. Was he a consulting economist or a member--

Mr. Houston. A member of the staff.

Mr. Maxwell.

Mr. Houston. Yes.

Mr. Wides. And her relationship with the university board was what, as an alumni?

Mr. Houston. As an alumni. She was called as a consultant on their investment program.

We also had the advice of a couple of friendly banks, and at least a couple of insurance companies would freely give us the benefit of their investment policies.

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Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Houston. To go back to the start -- it may have already been told -- back in the last fifties we found in the OGC office that the hardest thing to cope with were benefits for death or disability insured under covery circumstances, particularly when, as so often happened, no prior planning had been made for this. Even the prior planning is difficult, because if you are doing to put an agent into certain circumstances, and say you will get him insurance through Mutual of Omaha, if the circumstances of the Department are later known to Mutual of Omaha, energially you wouldn't have your insurance.

So, we came to the conclusion that we needed our own insurance business, and we started by buying two very small off-shore insurance companies, and started writing death and health policies. Now, the business grew quite rapidly to cover all sorts of covert operations. And we went to two large outside insurance companies and asked if they would cooperate and take some of the policies either on a fully protected basis from us, or if they saw fit, for their own account. And both of them did both. They would take some risks for their own account, and the only thing we would ask is that they protect the investigation in case it got into sensitive fields.

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in others they would ostensibly take the risk and we would stand behind them.

> Mr. Wikes. So that was indemnification?

Mr. Houston. Complete indemnification. And by large this arrangement worked extremely well.

Mr. Wikes. Southose were the kinds of insurance companies were were talking about that would give us the benefit of their investment?

Mr. Houston. Both of them had large investment portfolios of their own, and feel I gave us access to their investment manager, who were most cooperative in what they were investing.

Mr. Wikes. And what was the point of contact in the Agency during that period for the insurance companies?

Mr. Houston. I went in both cases to set up the original contact, and then this project officer w primary.

Mr. Wikes. And he would have been the point of contact for receiving their investment views?

Mr. Houston. He or his office.

Mr. Wides. And you mentioned also a bank as an outside source.

Mr. Houston. There were a couple of banks, but one particularly. We kept some of the money on deposit with the bánk.

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The bank at our

requese gave us a flat guarantee of repayment no matter what on these assets. So, we felt well protected on this. And also, when we deposited with them the certificates of deposit we got the normal prime rate on our deposits. And here again they particularly in the field of Eurobonds had some good advice, and we also went to another brokerage house in New York who had investment advisory staff that specialized in Eurobonds. So far as I know, they did not know the Agency was involved, but they gave advice on the best interest rates in Eurobonds and certificates. It was a highly specialized field.

Mr. Maxwell. Who was going to the investment house, the project officer?

Mr. Houston. The project officer

Mr. Wides. Do you recall any dealings with Suydam and Company?

Mr. Houston.No. I have been asked time and time again about Suydam Company, and the only thing I knew was from personal knowledge going back to a trust my sister has an interest in in the Guaranty Trust. They had one of these holding companies which I think was called Suydam and Company. But you never heard -- who was it? I know. One of our directors of Southern Air Transport told me that he was continually being asked by contact with Suydam and Company. And he said

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that is the only one he knows, was the Guaranty Trust. There was someone else, I don't know about it.

Mr. Wides. GEtting back to the question I alluded to while we were off the record, did any questions arise about whether the people on the board, the investment board, or managing board of Mutual, who were from within the Agency, would have access to economic intelligence or political intelligence relevant to their own thinking on investments, and

Mr. Houston. The members of the board were always free to bring up their ideas for investments, particularly in the stock field, until more recent years. But mainly we were consulting the economic experts for their general economic knowledge on trends and any input they could give on basic investment policies.

Mr. Wides. That would include, I assume, economic intelligence regarding, for example, the trend of whether there was likely to be a copper shortage, or the trend of whether there was likely to be more nationalization of rubber plantations or oil?

How would you differentiate that from economic intelligence except that it would be --

Mr. Houston. Because our investments, except for the Europonds, were almost entirely in U.S.investments. And while these were trained economists, their main professional

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interest was in the foreign field. And I don't remember them staying for instance, let's get into copper, it is going to be in very short supply in Peru or whatever. I don't remember any discussion of that sort.

Mr. Wides Do you recall any policy papers or reviews generally as to the use of Agency knowledge in the broadest sense of its intelligence fund in regard to the investment decisions as distinct from decisions that were generated wholly by outside?

There were various basic general policy Mr. Houston. papers -- usually I would prepare them and put them before the board -- in which this may have been touched on. I don't recall it specifically.

The source of funds invested under the Mr. Maxwell. auspices of the board were will

In other words, all these companies that we had in this insurance complex appeared to have the substance and insraance company would be expected to have. Actually, whole fund for all of them was managed as a central fund under this one project officer. On the design and organizational

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chart it looked very complicated. In operation it was quit was handled really as one entity with various faces simple. And the complications of those whereby maintaining appearing. your directors, who took no part in the operation, your companies directors, and things, and keeping your letterhead straight for your writing for the different companies.

Mr. Maxwell. Were there other sources of funds, in stock or bond transactions that profits went back into the investment fund?

They would all go into the central in-Mr. Houston. vestment fund, and in the initial stages, particularly where there was income from funds and dividends -- until the stock market broke there were some capacity gains registered. the investment policy went more and more, particularly as the interest rate went up, in the Eurobonds and certificates of deposit, where for a while you were getting -- I think we got a weighted average of over 11 percent. And then those would go back into the fund against the insurance loss account-The most difficult thing we had was trying to ability. decide what was fenough, because there was no actuarial experience such as in a nominal insurance company.

Mr. Wides. You mean the capitalization of particular companies against insurance?

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Mr. Wides. With regard to the investment, in the case of certificates of deposit abroad I take it that is what you are referring to as the weighted average, when you weighted Eurodollars Eurobonds and certificates of deposit. Whatever the form were some of the investments in foreign countries made in any way in consultation with the operating divisions in regard to the non-investment aspects of the loan, if you wall,

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Mr. Houston. No.

Let us get one thing straight. The certificate of deposit were domestic.

Mr. Wides. Were there any foreign loans?

Mr. Houston. There were no foreign loans that I recall.

The Eurodollar bonds were in the case those which were guaranteed by a U.S. company.

I can't even be sure of that but my recollection is by and large of subsidiaries of U.S. companies which do not guarantee their subsidiary bonds.

Mr. Wides. Thank you.

Mr. Maxwell. I wouldlike to go through some of the material in the Olsen case. And I have marked as Houston Exhibit 5 the excerpts from the IG's diary which I showed you before.

(The document referred to was marked Houston Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)

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